

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000700010004-5

MO #832-76

National Intelligence Officers

26 May 1976

NOTE FOR: The Director

FROM : George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO

SUBJECT : The PFIAB Treaty

Attached is what should be a self-explanatory note to Bob Galvin which I would like to send him if this package meets with your approval.

STAT

George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO

Wheaton Byers
let her fly
OK G 13
26 May 1976

cc: NIO/SP

STAT

GACarver/

Distribution

- Original ✓ Addressee (Wheaton Byers for R. Galvin)
 1 - PFIAB SUBJECT
 1 - D/NIO Chrono
 1 - RI

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

26 May 1976

Mr. Wheaton Byers
Executive Officer
President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Room 340
Executive Office Building

Wheaton:

Attached is the letter to Bob Galvin with its attachment (a draft note from him to the DCI) which I mentioned in our telephone conversation. Would you please get this letter and its attachment to him as expeditiously as possible.

Many thanks.

STAT



George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

26 May 1976

Mr. Robert W. Galvin
Chairman
NIE Evaluation Committee
The President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board

Dear Bob,


Per our 12 May conversation, attached for your consideration is a draft of a possible letter to George Bush which you could sign as Chairman of the Evaluation Committee or Leo could sign as Chairman of the PFIAB. Such a document will help ensure that all interested parties have a clear understanding -- and the same understanding -- of how the experiment is to be conducted, but handling matters this way (rather than by a NSDM) will contribute a good deal to maintaining the atmosphere of cordial, close cooperation we all want to preserve.

I took the initial cut at the attached draft, which Howard and his Strategic Program colleagues then improved and refined. It was intended to reflect the spirit of our conversation and the substance of the agreements we reached. I certainly hope it does both to your satisfaction. It also outlines the details of an experimental approach whose practical mechanics we believe are feasible.

Once again, many thanks for your hospitality in Chicago. I enjoyed our discussion and benefited greatly from it. We are all working toward a common goal, and those of us in the intelligence community appreciate the suggestions and help given by you and your colleagues on the Board.

With warmest regards.

Sincerely,



George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

25X1

25X1

Attachment



~~SECRET~~

The Honorable George Bush
Director of Central Intelligence

Dear George,

As you know, one of the major concerns of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has long been the quality of the Intelligence Community's estimates, especially those dealing with the strategic capabilities -- both offensive and defensive -- of the USSR. National Intelligence Estimates in this field are perhaps the most important products of the Intelligence Community. Every possible step must be taken to continually improve their comprehensiveness, soundness and utility to the President and his senior advisors.

Over the past year, the Board's continuing concern with this subject has been a matter of special interest and has been given special emphasis. There is no need to rehearse the chronology of the Board's discussions with the President on this matter, with Mr. Colby and with members of the DCI's staff responsible for the production of estimates in this field. We think this dialogue has been productive and we hope it will continue, as we all work together toward the common goal of better National Intelligence Estimates, especially in this critical area.

One recommendation the Board has made, and which its NIE Evaluation Committee has refined, is that an experiment in competitive analysis be undertaken in connection with the production of this year's estimate on Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict: NIE 11-3/8-76. We have discussed this experiment with your Deputy for National Intelligence Officers and, in light of those discussions, we jointly propose the following ground rules to guide this experiment:

(1) NIE 11-3/8-76 itself will be prepared by the Intelligence Community in accordance with the work plan developed by the NIO for Strategic Programs. For the purposes of this letter, those working on NIE 11-3/8-76 will be referred to as the "A Team."

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(2) In the preparation of this NIE, key uncertainties identified by, and divergent opinions arising within the US Intelligence Community will be clearly presented, using techniques of presentation familiar to readers of the Estimate as well as any new techniques the Intelligence Community may find desirable.

(3) In addition, with respect to certain key issues, an experiment in the technique of competitive analysis will be conducted. Candidate issues for this experimental treatment include Soviet ICBM accuracy, Soviet low-altitude air defense capabilities, etc. Three such issues will be selected by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence.

(4) On each of the three issues selected for the experiment, the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the NIE Evaluation Committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, will select a "B Team" of appropriate size. The members of the three "B Teams" will be persons inside or outside the Intelligence Community and the Government, who have expert knowledge in the subjects in question, who have (or can be granted) the necessary clearances, but who are not themselves engaged in the production of the NIE.

(5) In their respective areas, each of the three B Teams will work independently of the NIE 11-3/8-76 A Team. Each B Team, however, will be given access to all of the information on its area of concern available to the US Government, i.e., it will have access to the same body of information and data on the issue which it is to address as is available to the A Team. Also, each B Team will adhere to the A Team's production schedule so that the three B Teams' drafts of their respective independent assessments are completed at the same time that the basic estimate (A Team) draft is finished.

(6) Once all drafts are completed, the A Team and the overall managers of the Estimate will be given access to the three B Teams'

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drafts, and each B Team will be given access to all portions of the basic Estimate draft relating to that B Team's area of concentration.

(7) Each B Team will then meet with members of the A Team to discuss their respective findings and conclusions. These discussions will not -- repeat not -- be aimed at striking compromises or reaching consensus judgments. Their purpose, instead, will be to ensure that both the A Team and the B Teams are compelled to defend their factual assertions and their use of evidence and analysis before peers equally well versed in the technical details of their respective subjects.

(8) After these discussions, both the A Team and the B Teams will have an opportunity to revise their drafts to the extent that they care to make such revisions.

(9) The three B Teams will then prepare written comments on the portions of the revised basic Estimate draft dealing with their respective areas of concern. Similarly, the A Team will prepare written comments on the three revised B Team drafts.

(10) The entire package -- basic Estimate draft, the three B Team drafts, and the comments of A and B teams -- will then be studied by, briefed in detail to, and discussed by the National Foreign Intelligence Board, chaired by the DCI. Once again, the purpose of this discussion will not -- repeat not -- be that of effecting compromises or reaching consensus judgments. Instead, it will be to ensure that all parties' evidence and analyses are on the table and open to challenge.

(11) The final Estimate will be issued, as usual, by the DCI. The three B Team submissions will be forwarded with it to selected recipients including the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the PFIAB. The separate, experimental volume containing these submissions will also reproduce for ready reference the A team analyses of the same subjects and will contain as well the comments of the A and B teams on each others' submissions.

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(12) After NIE 11-3/8-76, along with the experimental volume, is forwarded, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the DCI and the PFIAB, will select a panel of senior consumers, civilian and military, to review the experiment and critique its results.

We may find that the independent, competitive B Teams reach judgments in their respective areas considerably different from the judgments reached by the A Team. Alternatively, we may find that these groups, working independently, come out with essentially similar conclusions. At this writing we do not know what the experiment will produce or prove. Nor should we; for if we did, the experiment would be pointless. No matter what the experiment's concrete outcome may be; if, in the process of conducting it we discover ways to improve the Intelligence Community's estimates, the experiment will have been worthwhile.

Sincerely,

Robert W. Galvin
Chairman
NIE Evaluation Committee

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